A Russian Radical and East Asia in the Early Twentieth Century: Sudzilovsky, China, and Japan

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Abstract

This article deals with the noted Russian Narodnik revolutionary Nikolai Sudzilovsky-Russel (1850–1930), his views on China and Japan, and the background of those views in the Russian intellectual tradition. Russian revolutionaries tended to share many of the Eurocentric biases of their Westernizer (Zapadniki) mentors and often viewed Asia—East Asia included—as retrograde, Japan being seen as an exception. Russian Narodniks’ positive view of Japan was not unrelated to their belief in the unilineal hierarchy of progress and civilization, in which Japan was seen as topping Russia. Sudzilovsky-Russel’s views originally developed as a continuation of this paradigm. However, his observations of the contemporaneous Chinese revolutionary movement and personal exchanges with Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) showed him the revolutionary potential of China. In the end, he accepted the idea that a political revolution in China would provide an important impulse to the cause of social revolutions in the West. Concurrently, in the dialogue between Russian and Chinese revolutionaries, something akin to a general strategy for radical change on the world’s agricultural periphery was taking shape, anticipating a number of later ideological and political developments in both China and Russia. Sudzilovsky-Russel viewed the tasks facing Russian and Chinese revolutionaries as essentially similar: while catching up with the supposedly advanced societies of the West, both were to bypass the “plutocratic” capitalist stage on their way to an emancipatory, alternative modern future.

Keywords: Narodnik, Nikolai Sudzilovsky-Russel, Sun Yat-sen, socialism, revolution, catch-up modernization, China, Japan, Russia

Russia: East, West, or In Between?

The issue of Russia’s belonging—its ambiguous position between the West and its Oriental Others—has been an important focus for intellectual debates since the polemics between Westernizers (Zapadniki) and Slavophiles (Slavyanofily) in the 1830s and 1840s (Bird 1998, 11). The former saw Russia as a part of the West/Europe, while the latter developed a peculiar brand of Russian nationalism with a strong emphasis on the Orthodox faith and its differences with Western Christianity.1 On one point, however, both tendencies in Russian thought largely overlapped. Neither viewed non-Christian Asia—East Asia included—with
any particular sympathy. Regardless of what they thought about Russia’s putative belonging to the West, most prominent nineteenth-century Russian thinkers had few doubts about the “Orient’s” position as Russia’s Other. For Alexander Herzen (1812–1870), an archetypical radical Westernizer who ended up being disillusioned by the bourgeois West, “China” was the best metaphor to describe the West’s supposed philistine conservatism. For Herzen’s opponent, Slavophile Alexei Khomyakov (1804–1860), “Kushite” Asia—that is, nonmonotheistic cultures (the Buddhist-Confucian cultures of East Asia included)—was the inimical Other of choice. Habitually Orientalized by Western Europeans, nineteenth-century Russia developed its own Orientalism in relation to its Eastern neighbors.

New developments after the 1860s rapidly transformed East Asia into a policy issue as well. The Peking Treaty (1860) gave Russians a foothold in the Pacific; in the mid-1890s, Russia developed an activist East Asia policy and became embroiled in the rivalry against Japan over Korea and Northeastern China (Manchuria) (Multatuli 2013, 206–338). The monolithic picture of the East was to be replaced by more concrete perceptions of individual countries; these perceptions tended to change in accordance with developments on the ground but, at the same time, followed certain underlying patterns. The patterns of Russia’s colonialist Orientalism were by no means monolithic. Some of them were hardly more than crude Eurocentric legitimations for colonial conquest, whereas others demonstrated Russia’s sense of distance from the West. Nikolai Przhevalsky (1839–1888), a noted Russian military explorer of Central Asia in the 1870s and 1880s, had already developed in the 1870s a Social Darwinist theory according to which Russia’s conquest of the adjacent parts of China would only follow the logic of the struggle for survival. More pessimistically, Alexei Kuropatkin (1848–1925), a Tsarist general notorious for his ineptness in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), was already by the late 1880s concerned about a potential threat from China’s “incalculable masses.” Another doomsday prophet was philosopher Vladimir Solovyev (1853–1900), notorious for his apocalyptic predictions about “teeming Yellow hordes” that would soon overtake the West (Solovyev 1994, 304). On the other hand, Orientalism in late imperial Russia could also imply an Orientophilic belief that Russia’s essential non-Westernness would facilitate its eastward penetration. This line was typified by Prince Esper Ukhtomsky (1861–1921), who saw the Orient—and especially East Asia—as having been intimately related to Russia since the times of Mongol domination (1237–1480). Ukhtomsky’s vision of Russia integrating the Central and East Asian worlds anticipated the
views of 1920s Eurasianists of Russia’s postrevolutionary emigration. It has to be remembered, however, that—its positive take on the East notwithstanding—Ukhtomsky’s Orientophilia still reflected a classical imperial ideology. Mutual affinity between Russians and “Orientals” was, in the end, intended to facilitate the integration of the latter into the formers’ empire.

**Japan: Close and Distant**

One Eastern country was, however, Russia’s equal and rival, rather than a potential candidate for inclusion into its domain. This was Japan. By the late nineteenth century, Russia and Japan occupied comparable positions within the capitalist world system. Both were peripheral powers, importers of capital and technology and exporters of either resources or textiles. Russia was, however, inferior to Japan according to a number of sociocultural development measures. Apart from the racist disdain for all “Yellows” or the Christian otherization of the “heathens,” Russians had few grounds for assuming a superior position vis-à-vis their Japanese interlocutors. This state of affairs was not lost on Russia’s policy makers. The future Tsar Nicolas II, despite suffering an attempt on his life in Japan in 1891, still confessed in a private letter that he admired Japan. His chief of the general staff, General Viktor Sakharov (1848–1905), prophetically wrote in 1903 that, in the event of a war, Japan would be strong enough to drive Russian forces away from their strongholds in Northern China. Whether such a war would be advisable was a hotly debated question. Indeed, Russia’s mighty finance minister, Sergei Witte (1849–1915), confessed his belief that such a war would be a “disaster for Russia” in a private letter in 1901 (cited in Schimmelpennick van der Oye 2001, 79). Even those who opted for a war—for example, Admiral Zinoviy Rozhestvensky (1848–1909), the chief of the naval staff—appealed to their colleagues to “eschew the disdain for the Yellow race” and attempt to develop Russia’s naval forces in the Pacific at least to a level comparable to that of the Japanese (cited in Kondratenko 2004, 107). It was quite clear that, as another catch-up power, Japan of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was an Other to be treated as an equal by Russians.

While Japan and Russia followed a similar developmental trajectory, one difference lay in their modes of integration into the world system. Russia’s integration was conducted by means of Tsarist absolutism, while Japan—which modernized in the mid-nineteenth century, when constitutionalism already enjoyed the position of a standard form of
governance—had to adopt some elements of constitutional order by the end of the nineteenth century. Granted, Japan’s first constitution, dating from 1889, was “bestowed” by the “sacred and inviolable” emperor onto his subjects. Still, pre-1905 Russia had neither constitution nor diet. The contrast was not lost on Russian revolutionaries, for whom Japan was an example of a country that had managed to modernize its sociopolitical system in addition to its military and economy. Seen from such an angle, the tacit collaboration between the Japan-based revolutionary exiles and the Japanese authorities during the Russo-Japanese War—which I will discuss in more detail below—was hardly unprincipled on the part of the former. While this collaboration has been largely covered by existing scholarship, this article focuses on the evolution of Russian radicals’ view of Russia’s unusually advanced Oriental neighbor and, by extension, their view of East Asia in general. I will show how the visions of Russian socialists—most centrally, Nikolai Sudzilovsky-Russel (1850–1930) (figure 1), who himself lived in China, Japan, and the Philippines from 1905 until the end of his life—gradually changed from a Eurocentric perspective that contrasted a “reactionary” China with a “progressive” Japan to one that acknowledged, at least partly, both the fallacies of one-dimensional Eurocentrism and the global facets of the Chinese revolution.

Russian radicals’ interactions with East Asia prior to the 1917 October Revolution have received significant attention by Soviet, Japanese, and Anglophone historians, among others. Soviet historiography traditionally emphasized the influence of the Russian Narodnik (populist) movement and the 1905–1907 Revolution on East Asia’s radicals. Soviet historiography, however, downplayed the Eurocentrism in Narodniks’ perceptions of Asia. This approach is also echoed by some English-language works, whose authors focus chiefly on the universality of Russia’s revolutionary experiences. It is undeniable that such an approach is highly useful: it allows us, for example, to discern the force of the Russian revolutionary example as an alternative universal standard for such peripheral countries as China (Price 1974). A brilliant recent example of such an approach is Japan-born British researcher Sho Konishi’s 2013 monograph, which takes as examples of transborder non-state interactions conducive to the creation of an alternative modernity space the following: Russian revolutionary and scientist Lev Mechnikov’s (1838–1888) positive evaluation of Meiji events as a “revolution”; the enthusiastic reception of Tolstoy’s “anarchist religion” among many progressive Japanese before and after the Russo-Japanese War; and transnational Russo-Japanese solidarity in wartime (Sho 2013).
That such interactions had positive effects is undeniable. This article, however, attempts to problematize the context and significance of these interactions, primarily for the Russian side. It aims to demonstrate that Russian Narodniks’ positive view of Japan was related to their belief in the unilineal hierarchy of progress and civilization, on which Japan was seen as topping Russia. By contrast, their view of China was still largely grounded in an Orientalist vision of an archaic society incapable of social revolution. At the same time, I attempt to demonstrate that a political revolution in China was of utmost interest to the Russian revolutionaries, who perceived the Chinese revolution’s problems and tasks as closely related to the difficult questions the revolutionary practice was posing in their own, relatively “backward” homeland. In the dialogue between Russian and Chinese revolutionaries, something akin to a general strategy for a radical change on the world’s agricultural periphery was taking shape, anticipating a number of ideological and political developments that would take place later in the twentieth century.

Figure 1. Nikolai Sudzilovsky-Russel. Source: Wikipedia Commons.
Revolutionary Eurocentrism

The Russian revolutionary tradition of the nineteenth century branched out from the Westernizers—initially as that tradition’s most radical wing—between the 1840s and the 1860s (Venturi 1964, 63–90). Not surprisingly, revolutionaries initially tended to follow the Eurocentric biases of the Westernizers. The coming revolution was to bring Russia up to the level of the most democratic countries of the West and even beyond. The Chinese Empire, on the other hand, was seen as the very embodiment of everything the revolutionaries protested against in their struggle vis-à-vis the despotic Tsarist regime. Moreover, China was overpopulated and was starting to adopt European military technology, thus supposedly threatening neighboring Russia. So, logically enough, Russia’s famed anarchist revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) assessed the “Chinese masses” as potentially dangerous “for us,” meaning for Russians and Europeans (Bakunin 1989, 398). Westernizing Japan, however, was from his viewpoint even more dangerous for the Russian prospects in Siberia and the Far East. In the late 1860s, Bakunin gloomily predicted that, given the vigor of Japan’s opening to the West, Russia had fewer than fifty years left to rule over its Pacific coast (cited in Lim 2013, 101). Interestingly, another well-known Russian anarchist, Pyotr Kropotkin (1842–1921), later viewed both China and Japan as potential industrial competitors for Europe as well (1912, 60–76).

Like Bakunin and Kropotkin, who lived most of their lives in Western Europe, a number of Narodniks—the group with which the main protagonist of this article, Sudzilovsky-Russel, might be broadly identified—lived in self-imposed foreign exile. While the majority sojourned in Europe, a small minority stayed for some time in Japan. Lev Mechnikov (mentioned above) was the first Russian Narodnik to visit Japan (from 1874 to 1876). Three decades after that, from 1906 to 1908, Boris Orzhikh (1864–1947), a later Narodnik, lived in Nagasaki, where he published a Russian revolutionary newspaper entitled Volya (Freedom) in the publishing house of the same name (Paichadze and Kang 1989, 75). Grigoriy (Hirsch-Isaak) Gershuni (1870–1908), an architect of the terrorist activities committed by members of the Social-Revolutionary Party, also briefly sojourned in Japan in 1906 (Crump 1983, 37–42, 214–217). Gershuni was an object of close attention for both Japan’s early socialists and Chinese revolutionary exiles in Japan. Sun Yat-sen was among the East Asian revolutionaries who met him and, as a result of an overnight discussion, reportedly came to the conclusion that revolutionary terrorism was inevitably needed in
Russia’s particular conditions (cited in Crump 1983, 219). This meeting was duly mentioned in Kakumei Hyōron (The Revolutionary Review, a journal edited by Pan-Asianist radicals). However, few other Russian revolutionaries of Narodnik or post-Narodnik persuasion could boast a record of foreign experience—including a long-term stay in East Asia—comparable with that of Nikolai Sudzilovsky-Russel.

**A Peripatetic Revolutionary between West and East**

The offspring of an impoverished noble family from what is today Belarus, Sudzilovsky—as a medical student—participated in Narodnik groups in St. Petersburg and Kiev before leaving the Tsarist Empire for good in 1875, escaping an impending arrest. After a brief sojourn in London (where he met Karl Marx), Sudzilovsky moved in 1877 to Bucharest, Romania, where he worked to spread socialist teachings among the locals and to further the Bulgarian national revolution. In Bucharest, he received a medical doctor’s diploma and adopted his pseudonym, Russel (“a Russian,” in Romanian), to escape the attention of Russian police agents. Following stints in Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece, the wandering doctor moved at last to the United States in 1887 and naturalized there in 1891. After a ferocious struggle against Russian Orthodox Church authorities in San Francisco (Emmons 1997), he moved further west to Hawaii in 1892. Obtaining popularity as a philanthropic doctor sympathetic to the plight of native Hawaiians, he founded the Home Rule Party in 1892, and, having unsuccessfully resisted Hawaii’s absorption by the United States, he was elected in 1901 as the first president of Hawaii’s Senate (Hayashia and Kittelson 1977). He lived in Hawaii until 1905, when he moved to Japan to conduct revolutionary propaganda among the Russian POWs there. It is most likely that the Russian revolutionary encountered both significant Chinese and Japanese colonies in Hawaii, and white racism against East Asians. A Soviet biographer of Sudzilovsky-Russel, Mikhail Ios’ko, made a strong point of Senator Russel’s aversion toward the habitual racism of the white residents of Hawaii vis-à-vis the native—and East Asian—population, and his criticisms of the generally disastrous results of white men’s domination over the native Hawaiians. However, such criticisms were not necessarily unique in late nineteenth-century Russian discourse on the West and its global domination: one did not have to be a Slavophile to offer a criticism of the West.

Herzen’s disillusionment with the West was mentioned above. Similar sentiments in
reaction to Western racist arrogance and colonialist practices, are visible in the travelogues of the famous Russian geographer Mikhail Venyukov (1832–1901), who was also one of Herzen’s correspondents. He characterized the British in China as parasitic racist bloodsuckers enriching themselves by forcing their opium on the poor Chinese. However, Venyukov (1970) also tended to contrast the “hopelessly reactionary,” “unchangeable” Chinese with the “progressive” Japanese of the Meiji era. Lev Mechnikov, mentioned above as one of the first Russian revolutionaries to stay for a prolonged period in Japan, broadly shared both Venyukov’s anti-imperialist views and his sanguine evaluation of Japan and the Japanese. Mechnikov saw Meiji changes as both “enlightenment” (prosveshchenie) and “revolution”—exactly the sort of changes he would have liked to see in Russia as well. China, however, remained for Mechnikov simply an “irrigation-based despotic society” (Sho 2013, 29–93). Before the Russo-Japanese War, this vision of a modern East Asia was largely shared by the majority of Sudzilovsky’s contemporaries—both liberal and conservative, Russian and Western.

**Progressive Japan, Conservative China?**

Japan—a constitutional monarchy that still allowed Sudzilovsky, an avowed radical democrat and socialist, to conduct anti-Tsarist propaganda among the Russian POWs there in 1905—was the very embodiment of evolutionary progress for the radical doctor. Hardly a militarist, Sudzilovsky was prepared to go as far as to acknowledge a progressive meaning in Japan’s victory over “inert and stagnant bureaucracy” in Russia (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1906a, 72–78). Indeed, rather than fighting the Japanese, the Russian commoners in uniform had to rebel—for the genuine interests of their own country first and foremost. That was the point Sudzilovsky was attempting to drive home in his speeches to the Russian POWs in Japan whom he hoped to win over for the revolutionary cause (Travis 1981).22 Sudzilovsky’s pro-Japanese bent did not go unnoticed by his Japanese interlocutors and played an important role in his being allowed to proceed with his POW propaganda plan. Sudzilovsky’s collection in the Russian State Archive preserves a letter from the Japanese consul-general in Honolulu, Saitō Kan, in which he certifies the Russian revolutionaries’ sympathy for the Japanese cause and asks the relevant military authorities to allow him to propagandize the Russian POWs. To this letter, an English letter (dated by May 17, 1906) from the editor-in-chief of Hawaii Shinpo (a local Japanese newspaper) is attached, with a description of a lecture on the war
that Sudzilovsky delivered in Honolulu for the benefit of the Japanese Red Cross Society, which bore tones of “sympathy to the Japanese attitude.” In one of his speeches to the POWs, Sudzilovsky blamed the war on the “obstinate avarice” of Russia’s “tyrants” and prophesized that soon Poland, Finland, and a variety of the peoples of the Caucasus would claim their independence from Tsarist misrule. Moreover, Siberia would be taken away by foreigners if Russians failed to dethrone the miscreants in power. Japan, which succeeded in freeing itself from the feudal vestiges, was an encouraging model rather than an enemy (Anonymous 1905).

Some of the personal histories Sudzilovsky encountered during his Japanese sojourn might indeed have strengthened his sympathy and his belief in the high “civilizational standards” that the Japanese managed to attain. He arrived by ship via Yokohama in Tokyo on May 30, 1905, and moved to Kobe, closer to the Russian POW camps, on January 31, 1906. However, already during his stay in Tokyo, he wrote a letter to a Russian POW from the Fukuoka POW camp, Fyodor Nazarov, who had created a small sensation by petitioning the Japanese government to allow him to naturalize in Japan. A liquor dealer, he viewed Japan as a friendlier place than Russia to conduct his business. Sudzilovsky’s letter to Nazarov, urging the latter to invest money in the Vostochnaya Nedelya (Oriental weekly) that the itinerant doctor initially wanted to publish (the plan was never carried out), was published by Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimbun (Fukuoka daily newspaper) on October 29, 1905 (Shinichi 1989). It is clear that Nazarov’s case could have demonstrated to the revolutionary doctor that Japan seemed a more promising place than the Tsarist Empire to an adventurous and inventive Russian commoner.

Additionally, unlike pre-1905 Russia, Japan as seen by Sudzilovsky was a society where his ideological comrades possessed certain—albeit limited—freedom of expression. A Japanese socialist journal, Hikari (Light), published by one of Japan’s pioneering anarchists, Kutsumi Kesson (1860–1925), entered into a friendly collaboration with Orzhikh’s—and Sudzilovsky’s—Volya, from the very beginning of Volya’s publication in April 1906. On May 5, 1906, Hikari carried an article on the “newspaper [published] by the Russian revolutionary party in Nagasaki,” in which the fact that both Volya and the Chinese revolutionary newspaper Minbao (People’s journal) were published in Japan was taken as grounds for hope that, at some point in future, Japan would develop into the center of revolutionary activities in East Asia (cited in Wada 1973, 1:140). However, the author of yet
another article on the “Russian revolutionaries” in the same issue of *Hikari* mentioned the “shame” he felt when one of *Volya*’s contributors, V. K. Vadetsky, compared Russia’s “repression” with the “freedom of press” in Japan. The author of the article in *Hikari* clearly regarded this compliment to Japan as exaggerated (cited in Wada 1973, 1:140).

Soon *Hikari* became a channel through which Russian revolutionary exiles could draw a more realistic picture of contemporary Japan. Beginning with *Volya*’s issue no. 18 (June 2, 1906), the Russians began translating and publishing selected articles from *Hikari* in their paper, including reports on streetcar strikes in Osaka and Kobe, on the reasons behind suicides in Japanese society, and on labor abuses at the Takashima coal mines operated by Mitsubishi in close proximity to Nagasaki. After the article on labor abuses appeared in *Volya*’s pages on July 28, 1906, no more translations from *Hikari* were published there, most likely due to the interference of Japanese authorities. This should have disabused the Russian exiles of their naive belief in Japan’s “democratic development” (cited in Wada 1973, 1:143–145). The Japanese socialist with whom the *Volya* circle presumably felt most affinity was Kōtoku Shūsui (1871–1911), Japan’s pioneering Social Democrat-turned-anarchist (Ivanova 1959, 59–65). His famous June 28, 1906, speech on world revolutionary currents, in which he referred to Russia’s 1905 Revolution experience as proof of the efficiency of a general strike (as compared to the parliamentary work), was approvingly translated and published in *Volya* on July 21, 1906 (Wada 1973, 1:143–144). Relatively liberal or not, Japan’s regime was obviously regarded by the Japan-based Russian revolutionaries as their ultimate class enemy.

The former president of the Hawaiian Senate was not the only Russian progressive to congratulate “progressive Japan” for its victories on behalf of Russia’s struggling masses. Lenin, too, rejoiced over the fall of Port Arthur to the Japanese (January 5, 1905), famously formulating his impression that “advancing, progressive Asia has dealt backward and reactionary Europe an irreparable blow” (Lenin 1962, 8:47–55). Lenin’s reasoning was that Japan’s bourgeoisie was reactionary vis-à-vis Japan’s own exploited classes, while at the same time progressive compared to the semi-feudal Tsarist autocracy. The closest parallel for the Russian autocracy would be, in Lenin’s eyes, Qing Chinese autocracy, although the former possessed decidedly greater military might. While vociferously opposing the Tsarist government’s plunder in China, especially its dispatch of troops to suppress the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, Lenin also made a direct comparison between the two “Asiatic governments” that “suppress every aspiration towards liberty by military force” (Lenin 1962, 4:372–377).
Sudzilovsky was not a Social Democrat, although he is known to have spread Social Democratic literature among the Russian POWs (Ios’ko 1976, 218–219). However, he followed a similar logic, initially accentuating China’s conservatism and drawing direct parallels between the Qing monarchy and his Tsarist enemies. Criticizing Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1827–1907), the ultra-conservative former chief prosecutor of the Holy Synod (the de facto head of the Russian Orthodox Church), he wrote:

Among all the conservatives of all countries and times, the Chinese are the only authentic, well-grounded and, so to say, scientific conservatives. Compared to them, all the other conservatives are nothing more than bad imitators…. The Chinese have discovered in antiquity that the original perpetrators of any progress are the inventors, and especially the inventors in the fields of mechanics and technology…. From this viewpoint, one cannot but be astonished by the profound and practical consistency of the Chinese conservative thought. To discover this real root of all evils and to systematically, persistently behead these devil-like inventors during many centuries means to create a powerful factor of artificial selection as a result of which the inventor as a human type disappears. (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1907a, 7–8)

Pobedonostsev and his ilk, in their zeal to imitate the “absolute conservatism” of the Chinese and stifle the tides of progress and democracy, in the end brought their own empire to a disastrous defeat (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1907a, 42). An unmerciful, take-no-prisoners criticism of the Russian autocracy was a particularity of Russian radicals’ discourse. However, the emphasis on China’s “unchanging stagnation” was not entirely dissimilar from the Orientalist logic of the likes of Przhevalsky, although Sudzilovsky, of course, manifested no enthusiasm for Russia’s conquest of China. Whereas Kuropatkin, Solovyev, and Bakunin saw the Chinese as a future threat, Sudzilovsky’s grudge against continental Asia was more in relation to the past. According to Sudzilovsky’s rather idiosyncratic interpretation, the first time Russian territories acquired real statehood was under the Mongols, and this statehood was just as despotic as its Mongol prototype. Moreover, the Mongol Yoke ended in the “mongrelization” of the Russian race and consequent “corruption of the people’s ideals” (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1907a, 21). The slant-eyed descendants of the Asiatic invaders provided the bulk of support for the autocracy and the reactionary Black Hundreds (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1907b, 34–58). The tireless advocate of native Hawaiian rights was no racist. However, both Eurocentric attitudes toward all the “stagnant peoples” of continental Asia and racist thinking seem to have strongly influenced him. While the emphasis on the supposed
Mongolian traits of Black Hundreds’ faces was not necessarily ubiquitous in the contemporaneous Russian revolutionary literature, the attribution of Russian despotism to the legacy of the Mongolian conquest was a discursive formation with its own long history. Indeed, the predominantly negative views on Mongols’ role in Russian history demonstrated by the Soviet historians since the early 1930s (Halperin 1982) had their roots in Russia’s prerevolutionary nationalist historiography. Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826), the pioneer of this historiography, is credited with having coined the expression “Mongol Yoke” (Milyukov 1913, 167–178).24 In a word, Sudzilovsky gave a progressive bent to the Eurocentric notions already inherent to the mainstream of the Russian sociopolitical thought, both in his linking of Russian ultra-conservatism to the Mongols and in his singling out of Chinese conservatism as archetypical.

**The Encounter of Two Doctors**

However, by 1906–1907, the revolutionary doctor had already encountered evidence that squarely countered his view of China as a reactionary monolith. Being well acquainted with Japan’s early socialists—he even contributed an article to the socialist mouthpiece *Heimin Shimbun* in February 1907 (cited in Crump 1983, 214–216)25—Sudzilovsky soon came into contact with Japan-based Chinese revolutionaries as well. Sun Yat-sen’s (1866–1925) republican newspaper, *Minbao*, positively assessed the program of the Russian revolution, which appeared on the pages of Nagasaki-based *Volya* (Kyuzadzhyan 1959, 38–39). *Minbao*’s second issue was illustrated by a large portrait of the “heroine of Russia’s nihilist party,” Sophia Perovskaya (1853–1881); the third issue was adorned with a portrait of Bakunin (Wada 1973, 2:180), whose concerns about the “Yellow threat” were obviously unknown so far to his Chinese admirers. The first-ever direct contact between the representatives of the Chinese and Russian revolutionary exiles’ groups seems to have taken place on March 10, 1906, when Song Jiaoren (1881–1913), a future Guomindang leader who was at the time simply a Waseda student and revolutionary activist, met—through the good offices of his Japanese friend Miyazaki Tamizō (1865–1928)—the legendary Polish-Russian revolutionary who eventually turned into an Ainu culture researcher, Bronislaw Piotr Piłsudski (1866–1918). Piłsudski emphasized to his new Chinese acquaintance the significance of social—as opposed to purely political—revolution; Americans might live in a republic, but they were hardly free in a capitalist-dominated society (Wada 1973, 2:190–191).
This meeting and subsequent contacts between Piłsudski and the Minbao circle established a pattern of comradely exchange between Minbao and Volya. Piłsudski’s April 10, 1906, letter to Sudzilovsky states that he forwarded to the rebellious doctor a letter from a “Chinese student” participating in the publication of Minbao. Yet another letter from Piłsudski to Sudzilovsky, dated July 30, 1906, confirms that Minbao’s editors received Sudzilovsky’s reply. It looks as if by July 1906 direct communication between Sudzilovsky and Minbao revolutionaries was established. A female revolutionary from China—thought to be Wu Ruonan (1886–1973), then a student at Aoyama Gakuin College, a revolutionary activist, and Sun Yat-sen’s secretary—published her letter in Volya on July 4, 1906, and praised the ongoing Russian revolution for its positive influence on the whole world, China included (cited in Ios’ko 1976, 231). Not unlike Piłsudski, she claimed that neither Europe nor America had so far managed to develop an authentic—that is, noncapitalist—civilization; the Russian revolution was making this effort (Wada 1973, 2:192–193).

By late 1906, Sun Yat-sen himself had made direct contact with his medical colleague from faraway Russia. Indeed, they shared a Hawaiian connection. Sun Yat-sen spent six years as a teenager attending a missionary school in Honolulu and left the tropic archipelago nine years before the Russian doctor headed there. When in London in 1896–1897, Sun had befriended yet another prominent exiled Narodnik, Felix Volkhovsky (1846–1914), who most likely translated Sun’s English booklet, Kidnapped in London, for its Russian publication in a liberal Narodnik journal, Russkoe Bogatstvo, in 1897 (Nikiforov 1980, 77–78). Thus, Russian revolution was an object of attention for Sun even before his encounter with Sudzilovsky. His earliest extant letter to Sudzilovsky is dated November 8, 1906. The Chinese revolutionary commended his Russian colleague for his interest in China, but disagreed with his belief that American capital might “help the backward” Chinese to “catch up” with the rest of the world. “I seldom saw a Westerner who had ever gone so far as to advocate an idea of regenerating China and elevating its suffering millions to the human standard by a practical way as you did” was Sun’s general impression of Sudzilovsky’s opinions. In his November 16 reply, Sudzilovsky tried to use examples of publicly beneficial missionary undertakings as an argument for his position. Sun, however, persuasively argued in his second letter (November 26, 1906) that American capitalists would never commit “commercial suicide” by helping China develop its own industry; on the contrary, they would strive to ensure its perpetual economic dependence, defining as an
“industrial Yellow peril” any advance China might make toward industrialization:

I might have misunderstood you appealing to American capitalists but unless it is from an altruistic point I do not see any good of so doing. They are not so foolish as to commit a commercial suicide by helping China adapt its own industrial armament and be independent. I am pretty sure that if we show a slight inclination in that direction, the cry of “industrial Yellow peril” will be sung out at once in the capitalist world of Europe and America. To make China forever an industrial victim is in their own interest. [It] is quite obvious, pure and simple. But since I myself and my comrades take up the movement, we have to further it in the social sphere as well.28

In a way, Sun deployed arguments similar to those we witness in the works of the later dependency theorists: the industrial prosperity of capitalist centers is based on their ability to thwart the independent economic development of the peripheries. Yet another argument Sun put forward closely resembled the Russian Narodnik theories: the Chinese revolutionary leader believed that China’s backwardness might eventually help its progress, since it had not developed U.S.-style plutocratic patterns and other obstacles to a noncapitalist future; thus, China’s revolution, even if purely political so far, would be highly beneficial to the course of social revolution elsewhere:

To solve the social problem, we are more fortunate than our Western brothers, for we are yet in a virgin state of modern civilization and our plutocrats are not yet born. Therefore we have no strong obstacles before our way [sic] as these highly civilized countries. China is a country nearly equal in poorness and the masses live in hand-to-mouth condition. So if there is any promise to improve the general condition, it will be welcomed by all. Modern progress had not yet reached China, we never enjoy its blessings and do not suffer from its curse. But when we adapt it into our social life, we are at liberty to choose what is best. If your view is that the regeneration in China would ultimately accelerate the social revolution in America and Europe then at least we [should] let the capitalists know that there is such a tendency. It is better than appealing to them to render aid to a movement which essentially works against their own interest.29

Concerning Sudzilovsky’s theory about China’s conservatism being conditioned by the repeated execution of inventors, Sun retorted that such things had little reason to happen after China opened itself to the outside world; he abstained from attributing any definite characteristic to Western missionary activities in China, citing a lack of factual material at his disposal.30 The missionary reports, with their inherent Orientalism, were seemingly one of the main sources of China-related knowledge for Sudzilovsky. In December 1906, Sun and
Sudzilovsky even met in Nagasaki, agreeing, in a more practical way, to assist each other’s endeavors, since the Russian and Chinese revolutions were complementary. Wang Jingwei’s (1883–1944) famed February 1910 attempt on the life of Prince-Regent Chun (1883–1951) was reportedly made possible by the explosives sent by the Russian revolutionary exiles in Nagasaki (Jansen 1954, 123–124). The use of terrorism was indeed one significant common feature of Sudzilovsky’s Narodnik revolution and Sun’s republican cause.

Otherwise, Sudzilovsky perceived the tasks of the two revolutions rather differently, despite all the witty parallels between Chinese conservatism and Russia’s own reactionary trends. In Russia, the primary revolutionary task for the veteran Narodnik was what he himself termed “consistent democracy” (*posledovatelnaya demokratiya*), which involved extending democratic principles to the economic sphere, first through the socialization of land: that is, by turning the land into common property and bestowing equal rights for using the land to all members of peasant communities. Indeed, a known Japanese anarchist, Kutsumi Kesson (1860–1925), even translated a speech by Sudzilovsky advocating the radical socialization (more concretely, municipalization) of arable land and published it in *Hikari* (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1906b), thus familiarizing the Japanese public with the central social tenet of the Narodniks’ revolutionary ideology. Further, “consistent democracy” implied socializing the industrial facilities as well (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1907b, 20–24). Taken together, these radical changes amounted to a class-based socialist revolution. Peasant Russia differed from the population of Western Europe, with its large industrial proletariat (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1907b, 20), but in terms of needing class revolution against private property regimes, they were similar.

China, however, represented a completely different case for Sudzilovsky. In his article “Peculiarities of the Chinese Revolution” (“Shina kakumei no tokushitsu”), published by *Kakumei Hyōron*, he put forward a view of Chinese society that strongly smacks of classical Orientalism in progressive garb. Unlike Europe or the United States, China had no private ownership of land and no landowning class. Nor did China have any bourgeoisie, since its industry was at the level of medieval Europe. Thus, there were no classes in the modern sense of the word, and no need as yet for a social revolution. Sun Yat-sen’s revolution was to develop into a political revolution, a struggle against the antiquated Manchurian bureaucracy. But such a struggle was important, too, since only liberation from Qing rule could give China a chance to join the civilized world (Sudzilovsky-Russel
In addition to betraying his Orientalist lens, the article lays bare Sudzilovsky’s limited knowledge of the Chinese revolutionary movement: indeed, the Minbao mentioned the equalization of (private) land ownership rights as one of the most important revolutionary tasks (Xue 1961, 49).

If even China—one of the greatest historical civilizations—was seen simply as a despotic giant by the Japanese-based Narodniks, what, then, was their view of Korea, a country forced into the position of Japan’s “protectorate” in 1905 following Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War? In his letter to Futabatei Shimei (Hasegawa Tatsunosuke, 1864–1909), a great Japanese writer—and prominent friend of Russia’s revolutionaries—dated October 5, 1907, Bronisław Piłsudski mentions Korea, most likely under the influence of news about the July 24 Korean-Japanese “treaty” removing the last vestiges of de jure sovereignty from what was becoming a de facto Japanese colony. Piłsudski expresses regrets about Japan’s “entering the path of imperialism and oppression of the independence of the weak,” but also hastens to add that Korea’s absorption into the Japanese Empire was “inevitable,” since otherwise the country would have been taken by Japan’s enemies or competitors, either the Russians or Americans. Concomitantly, he deplores the “low ethical level” of the Japanese settlers rushing to the newly acquired overseas possession, but hopes that more control by the elected officials over “villainous bureaucrats” will improve the matter (Piłsudski 2008). Sudzilovsky’s opinion was largely similar: in a 1908 private letter, he deplores poor Korea’s fate, but concurrently assures his reader that Korea’s reactionary bureaucracy was “ten times worse” than the cruel Japanese invaders. Of course, Russia’s progressives also demonstrated a certain solidarity with the cause of Korea’s independence. Indeed, Maritime Province–based newspapers (Ussuriyskaya Okraina, Vostochnaya Zarya, etc.), often staffed by former political exiles belonging to diverse radical groups, reported on the anti-Japanese guerilla movement in 1905–1910 Korea with pronounced sympathy, sometimes even referring to it as “revolution in Korea” (cited in Pak 2004, 410–411). Still, the Japanese actions in Korea seem to have been rather peripheral in the mainstream perceptions of “progressive” Japan by Russia’s pre-1917 radicals.

China remained a major interest for the Russian revolutionary exile. Sudzilovsky moved to Tianjin in 1920 and died there in 1930. The Xinhai Revolution of 1911–1912 seemed to strengthen the hopes he pinned on the Chinese republican revolution. In 1906, in his second letter to Sun, Sudzilovsky opined that China’s revival would facilitate a worldwide
socialist transformation (cited in Ios’ko 1976, 253); by 1912, Chinese revolution had become reality. Inspired by the development, Sudzilovsky wrote one more letter to his old contact Sun, now the first president of the Chinese Republic, on March 1, 1912. By this point, the revolution was already a fait accompli. Still, the ultimate course of events was far from certain, as a large part of Northern China was controlled by Yuan Shikai’s (1859–1916) forces, which were far from sympathetic to the republican cause. This uncertainty was the backdrop against which Sudzilovsky wrote his letter.

The main challenge for the newborn Chinese revolution, Sudzilovsky contended, was to undertake a republican transformation in a society where republicans were a small minority. Sudzilovsky anticipated that the revolution would produce a popular counter-revolutionary reaction, perhaps aided and abetted by foreign powers. To resist this, the revolution needed a large-scale troop of agitators, “to serve as intellectual medium between the new, progressive republican government and the masses.” These troops, together with propaganda pamphlets, meetings, and films, were to mobilize the population for revolution. However, Sudzilovsky did not expect foreign intervention, since foreign interests in China were locked in mutual competition and checked by the U.S. “open door” policy. Thus, the organization of a large, conscription-based revolutionary army could be achieved slowly, without overtaxing the populace. The army had to be organized on “democratic principles, under local people’s control in the shape of local militia,” and a standing military minimized in order not to disturb the agricultural cycle. A navy was of no use to Republican China, as it was not about to plan wars of aggression. Cultural reforms were to proceed slowly, too, to minimize the conservative backlash. Consolidating the republican government was, according to Sudzilovsky, the most urgent task.34

The experiences of the warlord era, which soon followed the initial failure of the revolution thwarted by Yuan Shikai’s grip on power, confirmed Sudzilovsky’s anxieties. Contrary to his fears, though, it was political fragmentation (“warlordism”) rather than popular conservatism that presented the revolutionaries with the most challenging task. It is noteworthy, however, that some of the ways in which both Nationalist and Communist revolutionaries attempted to interact with the grassroots movement—such as mass agitation campaigns35—were rather realistically anticipated in Sudzilovsky’s letter, although we have no way to know whether it ever reached Sun Yat-sen. Interestingly, Sudzilovsky’s recommendations appeared to take the Russian experience of Narodniki’s agitation among the
conservative peasants as its starting point, thus implicitly pointing to certain commonalities between the revolutionaries’ tasks in the two giant agrarian empires of Eurasia, namely Russia and China.

To what degree his firsthand encounter with the Chinese revolution changed Sudzilovsky’s Eurocentric picture of the world is a moot point: it looks as if the hopes for China’s revolution coexisted in his mind with the belief that the source of all progressive movements worldwide was still the West. In a 1910 collection of essays in Russian, Sudzilovsky described both industrial civilization and ideas such as democracy and individuality as Western inventions that were being transplanted to the static East (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1910, 13–16). Chinese revolution could be understood as an attempt at such transplantation by the Chinese themselves. Sudzilovsky’s Anglophone journalism followed a similar pattern. In a short essay ambitiously entitled “Eastern Emancipation” that was included in a collection presumably published in the early 1920s (the exact publication date is not known), the aging Narodnik derived Western superiority vis-à-vis East Asia from the West’s supposed accumulated advantage in the natural sciences, the sources of which he traced as far back in time as ancient Mesopotamian culture. Since East Asians were “isolated” for millennia from Western scientific progress, they had no reason to protest the inequality inherent in the exchange of Western manufactured goods for Eastern resources or simple, labor-intensive manufacture. The only humanistic solution was quick and effective development of science and industry in East Asia, though Sudzilovsky had little to say about how to achieve this end (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1920–?, 17–22). At the same time, the sort of pantheistic “monist” philosophy that Sudzilovsky had developed by the mid-1910s (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1910, 147–151) was clearly influenced by both Indian and Chinese philosophical systems. It was hardly a coincidence that the Russian doctor’s philosophical writings interested yet another believer in the unity of civilizations, Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) (cited in Ios’ko 1976, 290). In his positive interest in non-Western philosophical systems, Sudzilovsky came close to the Orientophilic trends typified in Russia at that time by the likes of Ukhtomsky, mentioned above. An essential difference between the two thinkers was their politics: whereas Ukhtomsky expected the Chinese Empire to be conquered by the Russian Empire, Sudzilovsky struggled against the latter throughout his life and allied himself with the sworn enemies of the former.
A Narodnik’s View of the Outside World

Both prerevolutionary Social Democrats and their Soviet successors tended to criticize Narodniks for their supposed lack of scientific world view in sociopolitical issues, while also showing deep respect for their revolutionary enthusiasm. Indeed, both criticism and respect of this kind seem fully appropriate in the case of Dr. Sudzilovsky-Russel. In practice, this Russian acquaintance of yet another rebellious medic, Sun Yat-sen, demonstrated a rare example of antiracist and anticolonial courage in times of high imperialism and “scientific” racism. The solidarity Sudzilovsky expressed toward Hawaiians and Chinese deserves respect, despite the fact that the Russian revolutionary seemingly continued to believe in America’s possible progressive role in the Pacific until the mid-1920s. Only at that point did he start to regard “plutocratic” America as more of an obstacle to the worldwide trends of progress, in need of a socialist revolution of the kind Russia underwent in 1917 (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1925, cited in Ios’ko 1976, 313). While Sudzilovsky was no racist, his world view was certainly racialized. By any contemporary standard, his belief in the especially pernicious role played by Germans and Mongols as the chief architects of the autocratic Russian Empire since the beginning of the eighteenth century (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1907a, 25–33) would be recognized as nationalistic political polemics rather than “science.” For all intents and purposes, he was more an eclectic amateur than a systematic and professional sociopolitical researcher.

As any eclectic tends to be, Sudzilovsky was often self-contradictory. Importantly, some of his self-contradictions reflected larger contradictions in the Russian intelligentsia’s general view of Russia’s and East Asia’s place in the world. Citizens of a semi-peripheral country, Russian intellectuals sometimes were inclined to view the “advanced” West as Russia’s perpetual Other and even to develop Orientophilic theories that would position Russia—together with China—as the West’s civilizational antagonists. At the same time, against the background of Russia’s long-standing aspirations to catch up with the West, a number of prominent Russian intellectuals (revolutionaries included) instead viewed Japan, an archetypical example of a catch-up success, as a possible model for Russia and generally subscribed to a Eurocentric view of the world. Sudzilovsky typified the ambiguity of many of his Russian peers vis-à-vis Asia by combining, in a somewhat eclectic and “unscientific” way, both positions: his stated belief in the significance of the Chinese revolution for the socialist movement across the world resided comfortably alongside his conviction that the East was
essentially conservative while the West embodied progress.

Given Sudzilovsky’s revolutionary background, his Orientophilia, naturally enough, took the form of revolutionary solidarity with diverse East Asian rebels. While he believed that East Asians had to catch up with the presumably more advanced Westerners, he also primarily viewed East Asia’s own modernizers and revolutionaries, rather than foreign “benefactors,” as the driving force of modernity’s transplantation. His collaboration with Japanese revolutionaries was hardly a surprise given the high esteem in which Japan was held by Russia’s educated society, conservatives and revolutionaries alike. Sudzilovsky’s close ties with Chinese revolutionaries were, however, a pioneering attempt to forge relations with the anti-establishment movement that would later become Soviet Russia’s official ally.

Indeed, as early as 1912, Lenin praised Sudzilovsky’s acquaintance Sun Yat-sen as the “spokesman of militant… Chinese democracy” (Lenin 1962, 18:163–169). As seen by Lenin, Sun Yat-sen was a “Chinese Narodnik,” a representative of the radical intelligentsia of a peripheral country who purported to speak on behalf of the peasant masses oppressed simultaneously by both precapitalist forms of domination and modern capitalism. Classifications of this sort are not free from Russia-centric bias. But, regardless of the degree to which the characterization of Sun Yat-sen as a “Narodnik” holds water, Sun’s exchange with a Russian Narodnik, Sudzilovsky, was indeed an encounter between two revolutionaries from the world-systemic periphery who both managed to grasp, across the walls of Eurocentric prejudices, that their revolutions could offer a number of lessons to each other. Sun Yat-sen’s beliefs in the possible advantages of China’s backwardness were indeed fully comparable to the Narodnik’s own vision of Russia’s agrarian communities taking the country directly into a socialist future. Both were revolutionaries from the giant, largely precapitalist agrarian empires attempting to legitimize their enterprises through speculation on the theoretical possibilities for bypassing the morass of plutocratic industrialism for the later-developers. As we know, attempts to “bypass capitalism” did not eventually lead to the hoped-for results in the twentieth century; however, in the end, the interrelations between the Russian and Chinese revolutions and their respective successor states went on to shape much of the modern and contemporary political history of the world.

The degree to which Sudzilovsky may be seen as a purely Russian thinker is debatable. He spent most of his life outside Russia’s borders. His views were formed through intellectual encounters with a number of Western progressives (Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell,
and Herbert George Wells included). If there was anything characteristically Russian in Sudzilovsky’s self-positioning, it was the feeling of distance vis-à-vis the West so typical of many Russian thinkers, including avowed Westernizers such as Herzen (Sudzilovsky-Russel 1907a, 13). To the degree that he was skeptical toward the West, Sudzilovsky could easily forge alliances with struggling communities on the periphery, be they Hawaiian independence activists or Japan-based revolutionary exiles from China. He could not, after all, fully belong to the West himself as long as he harbored the ambition to serve the Russian revolutionary cause. In this respect, he shared the fate of a number of East Asian revolutionary exiles who always had to negotiate their belonging in the space between their homelands and the Western-dominated international arenas of their globalized activities. He most likely felt that he had met a kindred spirit in the person of Sun Yat-sen, as both English-speaking, Western-educated doctors aspired for democratic revolutions in their countries, where the impoverished peasant majorities were hardly familiar at that point with the word democracy.

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Notes
1 See, for example, Khomiakov ([1855] 1987, 91).
2 By contrast, the “Iranian” East—“Arian” and monotheistic—was seen as more consanguineous to Russians. See Lim (2013, 70–75).
3 Przhevalsky found China “unreformable” and regarded Chinese as inferior to Europeans. See Schimmelpennick van der Oye (2001, 24–42).
4 Kuropatkin’s writings after Russia’s defeat by Japan are full of gloomy predictions about future “racial wars” against Asians. See Kuropatkin (1913).
5 On Solovyev’s (mis)understanding of East Asia, see Lim (2008).
6 In Ukhtomsky’s vision, the Orient was also potentially willing to accept governance by Russia’s paternalist Orthodox autocracy as a continuation of its own traditions of sacred monarchy. See Ukhtomskii (1896, vol. 2, part 3) and Schimmelpennick van der Oye (2001, 42–61).
7 On Eurasianism, see Glebov (2010).
8 On the changes in Japan’s position inside the capitalist world-system, see So and Chiu (1995). On the development of the world-system and Russia’s place in it, see Wallerstein (1974).
9 Both Russia and Japan were similarly under-urbanized, with an urbanization level of
approximately 18 percent by 1913. Russia, however, had a strikingly lower literacy level (about 30 percent) compared to Japan (above 70 percent) (Stepanov 1993). Russia also had a lower level of technology penetration into the quotidian life; for example, the number of telephones per 100 persons was 0.4 in Japan contrasted with 0.19 in Russia (Erofeev 2003).

On the racialized views of Japan in Russia prior to the Russo-Japanese War, see Kowner (1998).

He mentioned Japan’s well-developed rituals of hospitality and high cultural level. See “Letter to Empress Maria Fedorovna,” ГАРФ. Ф. 642, оп. 1, д. 2321. л. 163–164.

“Telegrams and Other Documents pertaining to the Negotiations with Japan prior to the Russo-Japanese War,” ГАРФ. Ф. 601, оп. 1, д. 514.

It empowered the bureaucracy and military rather than the “people,” only 1 percent of whom obtained voting rights in the 1890 Diet elections (Gordon 2003, 92–93).

See, for example, Travis (1981).

See Eidus (1956), one of the pioneering articles on the roles of Russian revolutionary movements and 1905 events in Japanese history. More generally, on the Asian repercussions of the Russian 1905 events, see Guber (1956).

For a typical example of such an approach, see Marks (2004, 17–33).

The 1907 article on Gershuni by Wada Saburō (1871–1926) went into great detail, attempting to educate the Japanese reader on Gershuni’s Social-Revolutionary Party. On the journal’s editor, Miyazaki Tōten (1871–1922), see Szpilman (2011, 133–137).

On Sudzilovsky’s role in the Bulgarian and Rumanian revolutionary movements, and in pioneering the spread of socialism in Rumania, see his most detailed biography to date by Wada (1973, 1:86–141).

On Russel’s activities in Hawaii, and his criticism of U.S. hygienic and medical administration there, see also Wada (1973, 1:172–181).

The story of the Russian POW propaganda campaign and Sudzilovsky’s role are vividly described by one of its initiators, George Kennan (1915).

As Sudzilovsky explained in a booklet on his Hawaiian experience, the native Hawaiian population was reduced tenfold during the nineteenth century as a result of “civilization’s penetration” (1907d, 22, cited in Ios’ko (1976, 167–169).

On his propaganda campaign in Japan, see Travis (1981).

Saitō Kan, “Letter from Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Sudzilovsky,” ГАРФ. Ф. Р–5825, оп. 1, ед. хр. 217. л. 1. The collection was originally a part of the Russian Overseas Historical Archive (RZIA) in Prague, and was transferred to Moscow in 1945–1946. See Pavlova (1999).

Karamzin, a staunch conservative, found the strengthening of the autocratic state power in the Mongolian period a long-term blessing, but still believed that the “Yoke” resulted in Russians becoming backward compared to the Western Europeans. Later, Alexander Gradovsky (1841–1889), Nikolai Kostomarov (1817–1885), and Fedor Leontovich (1833–1911) developed the theory which attributed the origins of Muskovy’s “patrimonial” statehood to the Mongols. See Pipes (2001). Sudzilovsky’s thinking broadly followed this line of thought.

The letters are available in the Russian Federation State Archive (GARF) collection: ГАРФ. Ф. Р–5825, оп. 1, д. 159. л. 1– 26 об. They were recently published by Latyshev (2000).
Sudzilovsky opposed the all-out nationalization of land, citing the inability of the central state to manage agriculture under diverse local conditions.

Sun Yat-sen agreed on that point in his second, November 26, 1906 letter to Sudzilovsky-Russell, arguing that, political revolution as it was, the coming revolution in China would pave the path towards modern economic development.

Letter to V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, June 7, 1908: ГАРФ. Ф. Р–5825, оп. 1, ед. хр. 199. л. 3. I would like to express my gratitude to Yulia Mikhailova for furnishing me with a copy of the letter.

On the role of mass agitation campaigns during the Nationalist revolution in the 1920s, see Murdock (2006).


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